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Madam Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today to
discuss some of the major issues affecting the design of an outpatient prescription drug
benefit for Medicare beneficiaries.  Those design issues present some difficult choices
among desirable, but potentially conflicting, objectives and need to be considered in
the context of the growing financial pressures facing the Medicare program.
FINANCIAL PRESSURES FACING THE MEDICARE PROGRAM
The growth of Medicare spending has been much slower in the past few years than it
has been historically.  In fiscal years 1998 through 2001, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimates that benefit payments will grow at an average annual rate of
3.1 percent, compared with 10.0 percent per year over the previous decade.  That
growth estimate reflects CBO’s May 2001 projections of baseline spending.
CBO further estimates that Medicare will spend $237 billion on benefits for 40 million
elderly and disabled people in fiscal year 2001.  Despite the recent slowdown in
spending growth, that amount is almost 25 percent more than Medicare spent five
years ago.   The program now accounts for about 13 percent of estimated total federal
spending, or 2.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
Moreover, CBO is projecting faster Medicare growth over the next decade.  We
estimate that Medicare spending will more than double—reaching $499 billion—by
fiscal year 2011, reflecting an average increase of 7.9 percent per year (see Figure 1).
At that rate, Medicare spending in 2011 will constitute 19 percent of the federal
budget, assuming that no change occurs in current tax and spending policies.  In fact,
the program will account for 36 percent of the projected increase in federal spending
by the end of the decade.
The latest report from the Board of Trustees for Medicare projects that total Medicare
spending will increase substantially in the long run, rising from 2.3 percent of GDP in
2001 to 8.5 percent in 2075.  In addition, the difference between projected total
Medicare spending and total federal revenues specifically dedicated to the program is
expected to grow substantially.  Sources of those dedicated revenues include the
Medicare payroll tax, the portion of the income taxes on Social Security benefits that
is paid to the Hospital Insurance (HI) trust fund (Part A of Medicare), and premiums
paid by enrollees for Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI, or Part B of Medicare).
According to the Medicare trustees, the discrepancy between total Medicare
expenditures and dedicated revenues will be $64.0 billion in 2001, or 0.6 percent of
GDP (see Figure 2).  By 2075, that gap is projected to grow to 6.0 percent of GDP.
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Medicare program's increasing dependence on general revenues to pay its bills.
These financial pressures have focused policymakers' attention on restructuring the
Medicare program.  There are two potentially conflicting considerations:
 First, Medicare spending is expected to grow at a rapid rate, making the
program increasingly dependent on general revenues and, ultimately,
unsustainable in its present form.
 Second, Medicare does not provide the protection offered by most private
insurance, since it lacks a stop-loss provision and coverage for prescription
drugs.
PROVIDING MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES WITH COVERAGE
FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
Modernizing Medicare’s benefit package by adding a prescription drug benefit could
close a significant gap in program coverage but only at a sizable cost to the federal
government or to enrollees.
Beneficiaries' Current Spending on Prescription Drugs
In recent years, growth in prescription drug spending has far outpaced growth in
spending for other types of health care.  Those rising expenditures have had a
significant impact not only on Medicare beneficiaries but on employers who offer
retiree health coverage and on state governments as well. 
Between 1990 and 2000, annual spending on prescription drugs in the United States
grew at nearly twice the rate as that for total national health expenditures, and it has
maintained a double-digit pace since the mid-1990s.  For the U.S. population as a
whole, three factors explain most of that growth:  the introduction of new and costlier
drug treatments, broader use of prescription drugs by a larger number of people, and
lower cost-sharing requirements by private health plans.  Within some therapeutic
classes, new brand-name drugs tend to be much costlier than older drug therapies,
which has also contributed to growth in spending.  Use of prescription drugs has
broadened as well, because many new drugs provide better treatment or have fewer
side effects than older alternatives and more people are aware of new drug therapies
3through the "direct to consumer" advertising campaigns of pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
Even without a Medicare drug benefit, CBO expects prescription drug costs for
Medicare enrollees to grow at a rapid pace over the next decade (see Table 1).  At an
average annual rate of 10.3 percent per beneficiary, drug costs are expected to rise at
nearly twice the pace of combined costs for Medicare’s HI and SMI programs, and
much faster than growth in the nation’s economy.  (CBO’s estimates of rising drug
spending are based on the latest projections for prescription drug costs within the
national health accounts.)
CBO’s baseline estimate of prescription drug costs for Medicare enrollees is up
significantly over last year because of higher projections of the rate of growth in per
capita drug costs.  Last year’s analysis indicated that spending by Medicare enrollees
on outpatient drugs not covered by Medicare would total $1.1 trillion over the period
2001 through 2010 (see Table 2).  This year, our projection for the same period is $1.3
trillion, or about 18 percent higher.
Our estimate for 2002 through 2011, the current 10-year projection period, is roughly
$1.5 trillion—which is about 33 percent higher than last year’s projection for 2001
through 2010.  The jump results from assuming a higher growth rate and replacing an
early low-cost year (2001) with a late high-cost year (2011).
Those changes to CBO’s baseline estimate—higher per capita drug spending and the
inclusion of a new high-cost year in the projection window—imply that proposals for
a prescription drug benefit will have a higher price tag than they did last year.  But for
any given proposal, the exact magnitude of the difference between CBO’s estimate for
last year and its estimate for this year will also depend on the bill’s specific features.
Existing Coverage
While third-party coverage for prescription drugs has become more generous over time
for the population as a whole, that trend is less clear for Medicare beneficiaries.  In
1997, nearly one-third of the Medicare population had no prescription drug coverage.
On average, Medicare beneficiaries paid about 45 percent of their drug expenditures
out of pocket (see Figure 3).  By comparison, all people in the United States paid an
average of 39 percent of the cost of their prescriptions.  Because Medicare
beneficiaries are elderly or disabled, they are more likely to have chronic health
conditions and use more prescription drugs:  nearly 89 percent filled at least one pre-
4scription in 1997.  Medicare beneficiaries made up 14 percent of the population that
year, yet they accounted for about 40 percent of the $75 billion spent on prescription
drugs in the United States.
Those factors suggest that growth in drug spending has a larger financial impact on the
Medicare population than on other population groups.  However, aggregate statistics
mask a wide variety of personal circumstances.  Nearly 70 percent of beneficiaries
obtain drug coverage as part of a plan that supplements Medicare’s benefits, but those
supplemental plans vary significantly in their generosity.  
Traditionally, retiree health plans have provided prescription drug coverage to more
seniors than any other source, and their benefits have been relatively generous.  In
1997, about one-third of Medicare beneficiaries had supplemental coverage through
a current or former employer, and most of those plans provided drug coverage (see
Table 3).  Although specific benefits vary, it is common to find relatively low
deductibles and copayments in employer-sponsored drug plans.
However, because prescription drug spending by elderly retirees has become a
significant cost to employers, many have begun to restructure their benefits.  For
example, a 1997 Hewitt Associates’ study for the Kaiser Family Foundation found that
among large employers, drug spending for people age 65 or older made up 40 percent
to 60 percent of the total cost of their retiree health plans.  Average utilization of
prescription drugs among elderly retirees was more than double that for active
workers.  Although relatively few employers in the Hewitt survey have dropped retiree
coverage altogether, most have taken steps to control costs, such as tightening
eligibility standards, requiring retirees to contribute more toward premiums, placing
caps on the amount of benefits that plans will cover, and encouraging elderly
beneficiaries to enroll in managed care plans.
Medicare+Choice (M+C) plans are another means by which the elderly and disabled
have obtained prescription drug coverage.  In 2000, for example, 64 percent of
Medicare beneficiaries had access to M+C plans that offered some drug coverage,
although a significantly smaller fraction of elderly people signed up for those plans.
Many M+C plans have scaled back their drug benefits in response to rising costs and
slower growth in Medicare’s payment rates.  Nearly all such plans have annual caps
on drug benefits for enrollees—many at a level of only $500 per year—and a growing
share of plans charge a premium for supplemental benefits.
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medigap) plans as their sole form of supplemental coverage in 1997, less than half of
that group had policies that covered prescription drugs.  Medigap plans with drug
coverage tend to be much less generous than retiree health plans; medigap plans have
a deductible of $250, 50 percent coinsurance, and annual benefit limits of either
$1,250 or $3,000.  Premiums for plans that include drug coverage also tend to be much
higher than premiums for other medigap plans, due in part to their tendency to attract
enrollees who have higher-than-average health expenses.
Certain low-income Medicare beneficiaries also may be eligible for Medicaid
coverage, which generally includes a prescription drug benefit.  All state Medicaid
programs offer prescription drug coverage (usually involving little or no cost sharing)
to people whose income and assets fall below certain thresholds.  In addition, as of
January 2001, 26 states had authorized (but had not necessarily yet implemented) some
type of pharmaceutical assistance program, most of which would provide direct aid for
purchases to low-income seniors who did not meet the Medicaid requirements.  About
64 percent of the Medicare population lives in those states.
Thus, middle- and higher-income seniors can usually obtain coverage through retiree
or M+C plans, while seniors with the lowest income generally have access to state-
based drug benefit programs.   However, beneficiaries with income between one and
two times the poverty level are more likely to be caught in the middle, with income or
asset levels that are too high to qualify for state programs and less access than higher-
income enrollees to drug coverage through former employers.
Design Choices for a Medicare Drug Benefit
A Medicare drug benefit might address a number of objectives.  The  most
fundamental would be to ensure that all beneficiaries had access to reasonable
coverage for outpatient prescription drug costs—but this fundamental notion allows
for considerable debate about what that would mean.  The various objectives that
might be thought desirable in the abstract are often mutually incompatible; as a result,
difficult choices must be made.   For example, it is not possible to provide a generous
drug benefit to all Medicare beneficiaries at low cost—either enrollees' premiums or
the government's subsidy costs would be high.  If most of the costs were paid by
enrollees' premiums to keep federal costs low, some Medicare beneficiaries would be
unwilling or unable to participate in the program.  If costs were limited by covering
only catastrophic expenses, few enrollees would benefit in any given year, possibly
reducing support for the program.  If, instead, costs were limited by capping the annual
6benefits paid to each enrollee, the program would fail to protect participants from the
impact of catastrophic expenses.
In designing a drug benefit, policymakers must make four fundamental decisions:
 Who may participate?
 How will program costs be financed?
 How comprehensive will coverage be?
 Who will administer the benefit and under what conditions?
Participation.  Although most Medicare enrollees use some prescription drugs, the
bulk of such spending is concentrated among a much smaller group.  In 1997, about
13 percent of enrollees had expenditures of $2,000 or more, accounting for 45 percent
of total drug spending by the Medicare population.  Forty-six percent had expenditures
of $500 or less, making up about 8 percent of total spending.  Most spending is
associated with treatment of chronic conditions—such as hypertension, cardiovascular
disease, and diabetes.  The skewed distribution of spending and the need for people
with chronic conditions to stay on drug therapies over the long term makes stand-alone
drug coverage particularly susceptible to adverse selection, where enrollment is con-
centrated among those who expect to receive more in benefits than they would pay in
premiums.   
Because of the likelihood of adverse selection, a premium-financed drug benefit
offered as a voluntary option for Medicare enrollees must restrict participation in some
way.  If Medicare beneficiaries were free to enroll in or leave the program at will, only
those who expected to gain from the benefit would participate each year.  That would
drive premiums up, which would further reduce enrollment as enrollees with below-
average drug costs dropped out.
Most of the drug benefit proposals developed in 2000 would have provided a
voluntary drug option, but they attempted to mitigate the potential for adverse selection
by one of two approaches:  either they gave enrollees only one opportunity to choose
the drug benefit at the time enrollees first became eligible, or they imposed an
actuarially fair surcharge on premiums for those who delayed enrollment.  Another
approach to avoiding the problem of adverse selection would be to couple the drug
benefit with Part B of Medicare, so that enrollees could choose either Part B plus a
7drug benefit or no Part B and no drug benefit.  In that case, even if the drug portion of
the benefit was not heavily subsidized, the current 75 percent subsidy of Part B
benefits would ensure nearly universal participation in the coupled benefit. 
   
Financing.  Program costs could be entirely financed by enrollees’ premiums, or some
or all of the costs could be paid by the federal government.  Given a one-time-only
enrollment option, participation rates would be reasonably high, even if the program
was largely financed by enrollees’ premiums.  If enrollees lived long enough, virtually
all of them would benefit from drug coverage, and the erosion now occurring in the
comprehensive coverage provided by private plans would also spur participation.
Further, employer-sponsored health plans would probably require that retirees eligible
for a new Medicare benefit participate in it, just as they now effectively require that
retirees participate in  Part B.  And state Medicaid agencies, even if not mandated to
do so, would choose to enroll dual eligibles (people eligible for both Medicare and
Medicaid) in a new Medicare drug benefit if their costs under the new program were
less than the cost of the drug benefits now provided under Medicaid.  However, if a
generous drug benefit was fully financed by enrollees, premiums would be high,
making the benefit difficult to afford for lower-income beneficiaries ineligible for
Medicaid.  The drug proposals developed last year all provided full subsidies to low-
income people for both cost-sharing and premium expenses, in addition to partially
subsidizing premium costs for all other enrollees.
Coverage.  A Medicare drug benefit could be designed to look like the benefit
typically provided by employer-sponsored plans.  If so, it would be integrated with the
rest of the Medicare benefit.  Further, it would have low cost-sharing requirements
(ranging from 20 percent to 25 percent coinsurance or a copayment per prescription
of $10 to $25) and stop-loss protection—a dollar limit above which no cost sharing
would be required.  Such comprehensive coverage would provide good protection for
enrollees, but it would be very costly.  Not only would it transfer most of the costs of
drugs currently used by enrollees to the Medicare program, but it would also increase
utilization among those who now have less generous coverage.   
One way to constrain costs and utilization is by limiting coverage—covering only
catastrophic costs, for example, or imposing a cap on benefits paid per enrollee each
year.  If Medicare provided coverage only for catastrophic costs, most enrollees would
receive no benefit payments in any given year.  Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate
to say that those enrollees would receive no benefit, since they would be protected
against the possibility of catastrophic expenses—the main function of insurance.
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reasonably expect to receive some benefit payments each year.  
Alternatively, policymakers could take the other approach to limiting costs:  covering
a portion of all drug costs but only up to a benefit cap.  However, because that
approach would not protect those enrollees who were most in need, most of last year’s
proposals included stop-loss protection. The end result was a benefit unlike anything
available in the private sector—a hybrid that had a capped benefit, then a “hole” with
no drug coverage, and finally a stop-loss provision, beyond which the program would
pay all drug costs (see Figure 4).  The larger the range of spending encompassed by the
hole, the less costly the program would be—but also the less coverage the benefit
would provide.    
An approach to limiting costs within the context of a more traditional benefit would
be to have a higher initial deductible amount, relatively high cost-sharing require-
ments, and a high stop-loss threshold.  Or the program could provide a more generous
benefit similar to those provided by employer-sponsored plans, with federal costs
limited by financing most of the program’s costs through enrollees’ premiums.
Administration.  The way in which a drug benefit is administered can also have a
significant effect on how costly it is.  All recent proposals have envisioned adopting
the now common private-sector approach of using pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs)
in each region.  Proposals have differed, however, in whether only one or several
PBMs would serve a region, in whether the responsible entities would assume any
insurance risk, and in the kind of restrictions that would be placed on them.  
Private health plans use PBMs to process claims and negotiate price discounts with
drug manufacturers and dispensing pharmacies.  PBMs also try to steer beneficiaries
toward lower-cost drugs, such as generic, preferred formulary, or mail-order drugs.
In addition, because of their centralized records for each enrollee's prescriptions, they
can help prevent adverse drug interactions.  The likelihood that PBMs could
effectively constrain costs depends on their having both the authority and the incentive
to aggressively use the various cost-control mechanisms at their disposal.  In the
private sector, PBMs often have considerable leeway in the tools they can use, but they
do not assume any insurance risk for the drug benefit.  At most, they may be subject
to a bonus or a penalty added to their administrative fee, based on how well they meet
prespecified goals for their performance.  
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Administration) adopted the typical private-sector model, with a single PBM selected
periodically to serve each region and with all insurance risk borne by Medicare, not the
PBM.   There are two main concerns about that model:  it might prove politically
difficult to allow the designated PBMs to use cost-control tools aggressively if
enrollees have no choice of provider in each region, and non-risk-bearing PBMs might
have too little incentive to use strong tools, even if they were permitted.
Other proposals (such as the Breaux-Frist bills and the House-passed drug bill)
adopted a different model, more akin to the risk-based competitive model characteristic
of Medicare+Choice plans.  Those proposals envisioned multiple risk-bearing entities
(such as PBM/insurer partners) that would compete to serve enrollees in each region.
Enrollees would have some choice among providers, so that beneficiaries who were
willing to accept more-restrictive rules (such as a closed formulary) in return for lower
premium costs could do so, while others could select a more expensive provider with
fewer restrictions.  If the entities bore all of the insurance risk for the drug benefit, they
would have strong incentives to use whatever cost-control tools were permitted.
However, they would also have strong incentives to try to achieve favorable selection
by avoiding enrollees most in need of coverage.  
One of the concerns raised about this model was that no entities might be willing to
participate if they had to assume the full insurance risk for a stand-alone drug benefit.
To mitigate that concern, the proposals included federally provided reinsurance for
high-cost enrollees.  (Reinsurance means that the federal government shares part or all
of the costs of high-cost enrollees.)  However, reinsurance would tend to weaken the
plans' incentives to control costs.  Another concern was that differences among plans
in benefit structures or strategies for cost control could result in some plans attracting
low-cost enrollees and others attracting more costly enrollees.  The risk of that kind of
selection would lead plans to raise the cost of the benefit.  Moreover, to avoid such
risks, plans would, over time, come to offer very similar plan designs.
The Cost of Covering Prescription Drugs for Medicare Enrollees
There are numerous design parameters that must be specified in developing a Medicare
prescription drug benefit, and decisions concerning those parameters can greatly affect
the benefit’s cost to the taxpayer and to the beneficiary.  This testimony provides some
examples of how costs would be affected by varying certain aspects of the benefit’s
design.
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The estimates that follow are approximate and subject to change; the cost of a detailed
proposal would vary depending on its precise specifications.  The estimates are for
2004 only.
Base Case.
  For purposes of this testimony, the base case is a benefit that provides
coverage for all of the outpatient drug costs of Medicare enrollees (see Table 4).  The
enrollee would be responsible for coinsurance equal to 50 percent of the cost of
prescription drugs up to $8,000 of spending.  The new benefit would cover the entire
cost of drugs above that amount.  Thus, the enrollee would be liable for up to $4,000
in out-of-pocket spending before reaching the stop-loss amount.
To pay for this program, enrollees would be charged a monthly premium designed to
cover 50 percent of the cost of the benefit.  The federal government would pay for the
other 50 percent.  We assume that a subsidy of that size would be sufficient to ensure
that all enrollees in Medicare Part B would participate in the prescription drug
program.
Low-income enrollees would receive a subsidy to enable them to participate in the
Medicare drug program.  Enrollees with income up to 135 percent of the federal
poverty level would receive a full subsidy of premiums and cost-sharing amounts.
Those with income between 135 percent and 150 percent of the poverty level would
receive a premium subsidy (on a sliding scale that declined with income) but would
be responsible for any cost sharing.  States and the federal government would share in
those subsidy costs for enrollees with income of less than 100 percent of the poverty
level and for those who were dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid.
The base case also assumes that a single PBM would administer the program in each
region, with all insurance risk borne by Medicare.  The cases presented in this
testimony do not consider the other major alternative for delivering a Medicare drug
benefit: instead of a single PBM, the program could be operated through multiple risk-
bearing entities who would compete for enrollees.  Competing PBM/insurer partners
who bore insurance risk would have a strong incentive to use such tools as restrictive
formularies and three-tier copayment structures to aggressively manage costs.
However, they would also incur certain "load" costs—such as marketing expenses to
attract enrollees and a premium for accepting insurance risk—that a single PBM would
not.  The net impact on program costs would depend on the specific details of the
proposal.
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The benefit design assumed for the base case would cost the federal government about
$30.9 billion in 2004.  The Medicare benefit portion of that total is $26.5 billion, and
the low-income subsidy (and interactions with the Medicaid program) account for the
remaining $4.3 billion (see Table 5).  As we will see in comparisons with other cases,
a less generous drug benefit would decrease Medicare costs but increase the cost of the
low-income subsidy.
In the aggregate, enrollees would pay a total of $26.5 billion in premiums, reflecting
a $56.80 monthly premium that they would pay under the base case plan.  That total
includes premiums that are paid by Medicaid on behalf of low-income enrollees.  In
addition, enrollees would face about $44.5 billion in cost sharing for the prescription
drugs that they used.  Again, that amount includes some cost sharing that would be
picked up by supplemental payers, including employer-sponsored insurance and
medigap plans.  As we will demonstrate below, a less generous benefit would lower
premiums but raise the amount of cost sharing paid by enrollees. 
Federal costs could be reduced by imposing more cost sharing on enrollees or by
varying other aspects of the design.  The following discussion of alternative cases
examines how the costs imposed on taxpayers and beneficiaries would change if one
or more features of the program are varied.
Change Beneficiaries’ Cost Sharing.
  The overall federal cost of a prescription drug
proposal would fall if beneficiaries were responsible for a greater share of program
costs.  Higher cost sharing would, of course, increase the cost of the low-income
subsidy.
Case 1-A is identical to the base case except for a $250 annual deductible.  Nearly 89
percent of enrollees have some prescription drug spending during the year and would
thus be liable for at least part of the deductible.  Including a deductible would lower
Medicare costs but raise low-income costs compared with the base case.  On balance,
the federal cost of the program would fall to $28.7 billion in 2004, and monthly
premiums would decline to $52.10.  Beneficiaries who had more than $250 in drug
spending that year would face higher costs under this option because the added cost
of the deductible would be only partly offset by the reduced premium.
An even higher deductible would further reduce program costs.  Case 1-B imposes a
$500 deductible on the base case, and the federal cost drops to $26.9 billion in 2004.
Doubling the deductible amount from Case 1-A does not double savings from the base
case, however, because some enrollees who would pay the full $250 deductible would
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spend less than $500 on drugs in a year and thus would not pay the full amount of the
higher deductible.
Lowering the coinsurance rate could alter program costs dramatically.  The base case
assumes a 50 percent coinsurance rate, while Case 1-C lowers that rate to 25 percent.
That adjustment increases the program’s net federal cost by nearly 40 percent, to $42.6
billion in 2004.  Medicare’s cost would increase to $38.4 billion, while the low-income
subsidy would fall to $4.1 billion.
The lower coinsurance would drive premiums upward as program costs rose.
Beneficiary premiums would increase by nearly half, to $82.30 monthly.  In the
aggregate, beneficiaries would pay about $38.4 billion in premiums.  However,
aggregate cost sharing would decline precipitously as well, to nearly $25 billion.
While all enrollees would face the higher premiums, the lower coinsurance rate would
primarily benefit enrollees with significant drug costs.
Raise the Stop-Loss Amount.
  The net federal program cost also could be reduced by
raising the stop-loss amount, although the additional financial exposure would increase
the cost of the low-income subsidy.  Under the base case, the stop-loss amount is set
at $4,000 paid out of pocket:  a beneficiary who had used $8,000 in covered
prescription drugs and paid 50 percent coinsurance would not be liable for any
additional costs incurred during the year.  (Enrollees who spend more than $8,000
account for about 23 percent of total baseline spending in 2004.)
Case 2-A raises the stop-loss amount to $6,000 in out-of-pocket spending.  That higher
level is equivalent to total spending by an enrollee of $12,000, which will account for
less than 10 percent of total baseline spending in 2004.  Under this option, the federal
cost of the program would fall to $29.8 billion, a reduction of 3 percent from the base
case.  The low-income subsidy rises to $4.4 billion compared with the base case.  Total
premiums fall to about $25 billion, and aggregate cost sharing increases to nearly $47
billion.
Raising the stop-loss amount by an additional $2,000—to $8,000—lowers program
costs by less than the previous incremental difference found in Case 2-A.  The federal
cost for Case 2-B is estimated to be $29.5 billion, or about 5 percent lower than the
base case.
Cap Benefits.
  A third approach would place a limit on drug costs covered under the
Medicare benefit.  Case 3 would impose such a limit when the enrollee reached $2,500
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in total drug spending.  That is, the enrollee would receive up to $1,250 in
reimbursement for drug expenses before reaching the benefit cap.  Such a cap could
be absolute, with no additional reimbursement for spending at any level above the cap.
However, Case 3 keeps the same stop-loss provision as in the base case, so that the
beneficiary faces no cost sharing beyond $5,250 in total charges.  That structure leaves
a "hole" in covered spending—a range of prescription drug spending for which most
enrollees must pay all of their costs.  (Individuals with income below 135 percent of
the poverty level, whose cost sharing is fully subsidized, would be unaffected by this
provision.)
Relative to the base case, the limit on coverage in Case 3 would lower Medicare costs
but increase the low-income subsidy.  The net federal cost would total approximately
$27.0 billion in 2004.  The option’s benefit cap would lower premiums to about $22.5
billion but raise aggregate cost sharing to nearly $52 billion.  Lower premiums under
Case 3, compared with the base case, reflect a less-generous benefit.
Combine Features.  The above options were designed to show how varying one
parameter of a prescription drug benefit would affect program costs.  This section
looks at alternatives that combine several changes at the same time.
Case 4-A combines the base case with many of the features described above:  a $250
deductible, benefits capped at $1,125 (after the enrollee reaches $2,500 in total drug
spending), and stop-loss protection after the beneficiary spends $6,000 out of pocket.
The costs of enrollees with income below 135 percent of the poverty level would be
fully subsidized inside the benefit "hole."
Such a benefit would be significantly less generous than the base case, but the costs
of financing it would be significantly lower as well.  In 2004, federal costs would be
approximately $21.5 billion, or about one-third less than the base case.  Likewise,
monthly premiums would fall from $56.80 under the base case to $35.90 under Case
4-A.  That causes total premiums to drop to $16.8 billion, with a corresponding
increase in aggregate cost sharing to $61.8  billion.
Case 4-B is identical to Case 4-A, except that low-income individuals would not be
subsidized inside the benefit "hole."  CBO estimates that in 2004, federal costs would
total $20.4 billion.  Nearly all of that savings comes from reductions in the cost of the
low-income subsidy.  Premiums would drop negligibly compared with Case 4-A.
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Case 4-C extends the low-income subsidy to individuals with higher income than in
previous cases.  Specifically, it includes all of the features of Case 4-A but provides
a full subsidy for premiums and cost sharing to enrollees who have income at or below
150 percent of the federal poverty level.  Enrollees with income between 150 percent
and 175 percent of the poverty level would receive a premium subsidy on a sliding
scale.  Medicare costs would remain roughly unchanged compared with Case 4-A, but
the low-income subsidy would increase to $5.7 billion in 2004.
Increasing the federal subsidy for beneficiary premiums would substantially raise
program costs.  Case 4-D is identical to Case 4-A except that the federal subsidy is
raised to 75 percent of premiums.  That change increases Medicare costs by 50 percent
compared with Case 4-A but lowers the cost of the low-income subsidy somewhat.
The net federal cost would rise to over $28 billion in 2004.  The sharp increase in
Medicare costs is mirrored by the sharp drop in beneficiary premiums, which fall from
about $17 billion in Case 4-A to about $8 billion in Case 4-D.
Because we have assumed throughout this discussion that the federal subsidy would
be at least 50 percent, the increase in Case 4-D does not yield an increase in
participation by Medicare enrollees.  However, if the federal subsidy declined below
50 percent, CBO assumes that enrollment would decline somewhat.
CONCLUSIONS
While policymakers are well aware of Medicare's long-run financial problems, they
also know that its benefit package has deficiencies relative to the benefits typically
provided by private-sector insurance plans.  One such deficiency is that the program
provides only very limited coverage for outpatient prescription drugs—an increasingly
important component of modern medical care.  But adding a drug benefit would
significantly increase Medicare's costs, and unless it was fully financed by enrollees'
premiums, it would exacerbate the imbalance between the program’s projected
spending and its dedicated revenues.
We are extremely unlikely to see a new drug benefit that has no adverse impact on
Medicare’s long-term financial status.  But, as I have discussed today, there are
important design features that could be built in to such a benefit to limit federal costs
while providing important insurance protection for enrollees.  In developing a realistic
policy proposal, hard decisions must be made to establish the proper balance among
competing objectives.
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TABLE 1. CBO’S BASELINE PROJECTIONS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG
SPENDING AND MEDICARE BENEFITS PER ENROLLEE,
CALENDAR YEARS 2002-2011
Average Annual
Spending per Enrollee (Dollars) Percentage Change, 
2002 2011 2002-2011
Drug Spendinga 1,989 4,818 10.3
Medicare Benefitsb 6,841 11,268 5.7
Memorandum:
Gross Domestic Product per Capita 39,275 56,569 4.1
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
a. Total spending per enrollee on outpatient prescription drugs not currently covered under Medicare, regardless of payer, based on CBO’s
May 2001 baseline projections.
b. Medicare benefits per enrollee under the Hospital Insurance and Supplementary Medical Insurance programs, based on CBO’s May
2001 baseline projections.
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TABLE 2. COMPARING CBO’S MAY 2001 AND MARCH 2000 BASELINE
PROJECTIONS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING
(By calendar year, in billions of dollars)
Year
May 2001
Estimates
March 2000
Estimates
2001 70 66
2002 81 74
2003 92 82
2004 104 91
2005 117 101
2006 131 112
2007 148 124
2008 166 137
2009 186 152
2010 208 167
2011 236 n.a.
Total
2001-2010 1,302 1,105
2002-2011 1,467 n.a.
Memorandum:
Percentage increase in total spending, May 2001 estimates over March 2000 estimates, 
for 10 years ending in 2010 17.8
Percentage increase in total spending, 10 years ending in 2011 (using May 2001 estimates)
over 10 years ending in 2010 (using March 2000 estimates) 32.8
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTES: Numbers may not add up to totals because of rounding.
n.a. = not applicable.
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TABLE 3. PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE AMONG MEDICARE ENROLLEES, 
BY TYPE OF SUPPLEMENTAL COVERAGE, CALENDAR YEAR 1997
Number of Medicare Enrollees
(Thousands) Percentage of All Enrollees
No Drug
Coverage
Drug
Coverage Total
No Drug
Coverage
Drug
Coverage Total
No Supplemental Coverage 2,921 0 2,921 7.4 0 7.4
Any Medicaid Coveragea 690 6,257 6,947 1.7 15.7 17.5
Employer-Sponsored Plans 1,669 11,160 12,829 4.2 28.1 32.3
Individually Purchased Policies 5,734 4,530 10,264 14.4 11.4 25.8
Other Public Coverageb 0 1,396 1,396 0 3.5 3.5
HMOs Not Elsewhere Classifiedc      675   4,696   5,371   1.7  11.8   13.5
Total 11,689 28,039 39,728 29.4 70.6 100.0
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 1997 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.
NOTES: Some beneficiaries hold several types of coverage at once.  The categories in this table are mutually exclusive, and CBO assigned
people to groups in the order shown above.  The numbers in the table may not add up to totals because of rounding.
HMO = health maintenance organization.
a. Comprises beneficiaries who received any Medicaid benefits during the year, including those eligible for a state’s full package of
benefits (so-called dual eligibles and those who meet eligibility requirements after paying their medical expenses) as well as others who
received assistance for Medicare premiums or cost sharing through the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary, Specified Low-Income Medicare
Beneficiary, and Qualifying Individual programs.
b. Beneficiaries who received aid for their drug spending through state-sponsored pharmacy assistance programs for low-income elderly
make up 60 percent of this category.  The remainder received prescription drug benefits through the Veterans Administration.
c. Primarily HMOs under Medicare+Choice risk contracts.
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TABLE 4. OPTIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT THROUGH MEDICARE IN 2004
Case Descriptiona
Federal Cost
(Billions
of dollars)
Beneficiaries’
Monthly
Premium
(Dollars)
Base Federal government pays 50 percent of premiums; no deductible is
required; beneficiaries pay 50 percent coinsurance; stop-loss
protection is provided after $4,000 in out-of-pocket spending 30.9 56.80
Option 1: Change Beneficiaries’ Cost Sharing
1-A Require a $250 deductible 28.7 52.10
1-B Require a $500 deductible 26.9 48.10
1-C Reduce beneficiaries’ coinsurance to 25 percent 42.6 82.30
Option 2: Increase the Stop-Loss Amount
2-A Raise the stop-loss amount to $6,000 29.8 54.30
2-B Raise the stop-loss amount to $8,000 29.5 53.50
Option 3: Cap the Benefit
3 Cap the benefit after $2,500 in total drug spending; provide stop-loss
protection after $4,000 in out-of-pocket spending; subsidize low-
income beneficiaries’ spending in the “hole” 27.0 48.20
Option 4: Combinations
4-A Require a $250 deductible; cap benefits after $2,500 in total drug
spending; provide stop-loss protection after $6,000 in out-of-pocket
spending; subsidize low-income beneficiaries’ spending in the “hole” 21.5 35.90
4-B Require a $250 deductible; cap benefits after $2,500 in total drug
spending; provide stop-loss protection after $6,000 in out-of-pocket
spending; provide no subsidies for low-income beneficiaries’
spending in the “hole” 20.4 35.80
4-C Require a $250 deductible; cap benefits after $2,500 in total drug
spending; provide stop-loss protection after $6,000 in out-of-pocket
spending; subsidize some or all cost sharing in the “hole” for
beneficiaries with income at or below 175 percent of the poverty level 22.5 36.00
4-D Increase the share of premiums paid by the federal government to 75
percent; require a $250 deductible; cap benefits after $2,500 in total
drug spending; provide stop-loss protection after $6,000 in out-of-
pocket spending; subsidize low-income beneficiaries’ spending in the
“hole” 28.4 18.00
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
a. The options represent changes relative to the base case.  The “hole” is the range of prescription drug spending above the benefit cap
and below the stop-loss amount.  To “subsidize low-income beneficiaries’ spending in the ‘hole,’” the federal government and the states
would provide aid through one of two approaches: beneficiaries with income at or below 135 percent of the poverty level could receive
some or all cost sharing and premium assistance; and beneficiaries with income between 135 percent and 150 percent of the poverty
level could receive premium assistance on a sliding scale.
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TABLE 5. APPROXIMATE COST OF ILLUSTRATIVE CASES IN CALENDAR YEAR 2004
(In billions of dollars)
Federal Cost to Taxpayers
Low-Income Payment by or
Subsidies/ for Participating Beneficiaries
Other Medicare Medicare Cost
Casea Medicare Interactions Total Premiums Sharing Total
Base 26.5 4.3 30.9 26.5 44.5 71.0
1-A 24.3 4.4 28.7 24.3 48.2 72.5
1-B 22.5 4.4 26.9 22.5 51.4 73.9
1-C 38.4 4.1 42.6 38.4 24.5 63.0
2-A 25.3 4.4 29.8 25.3 46.6 72.0
2-B 25.0 4.5 29.5 25.0 47.3 72.3
3 22.5 4.5 27.0 22.5 51.6 74.1
4-A 16.8 4.7 21.5 16.8 61.8 78.5
4-B 16.7 3.6 20.4 16.7 61.6 78.3
4-C 16.8 5.7 22.5 16.8 61.8 78.6
4-D 25.2 3.2 28.4 8.4 61.8 70.1
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTE: Estimates are based on CBO’s May 2001 baseline projections and assume that all costs are phased in fully by 2004.  Numbers
may not add up to totals because of rounding.  The table differs from Table 5 in CBO’s original March 27, 2001, testimony
because it reflects CBO’s May 2001 baseline, corrections to estimates of cost sharing for participating beneficiaries, and revised
estimates of low-income subsidies and interactions with Medicaid.  The approximate level of total drug spending by or for
beneficiaries who participate in the new Medicare benefit is made up of the sum of Medicare’s net federal cost to taxpayers and
Medicare premiums and cost sharing paid by or for enrollees.  Beneficiaries who choose not to participate in the new Medicare
benefit (in this case, those who enroll in Part A but not Part B of Medicare) would also incur prescription drug spending.
a. For descriptions of the illustrative cases, see Table 4.
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FIGURE 1. ANNUAL AVERAGE MEDICARE SPENDING GROWTH
FOR VARIOUS PERIODS
SOURCE: Historical data from the Health Care Financing Administration and projections by the Congressional Budget
Office.
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FIGURE 2.  PROJECTED MEDICARE OUTLAYS AND DEDICATED REVENUES
                  AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, CALENDAR YEARS 2000-2075
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SOURCE: Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (2001).
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FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF DRUG SPENDING FOR MEDICARE ENROLLEES,
BY PAYER, 1997
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office tabulations from the 1997 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.
NOTE: Drugs currently covered by Medicare are not included here.
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FIGURE 4.  POSSIBLE FEATURES OF A PRESCRIPTION DRUG INSURANCE BENEFIT
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
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